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Over the past decade the U.S. banking
industry has undergone many changes, includ-
ing the resolution of the savings and loan
bailout, the rise of Internet banking, numerous
mergers and acquisitions, and financial deregu-
lation. Although all of these have had, or will
have, a major impact on the banking sector, two
of these factors could alter the underlying struc-
ture of the U.S. banking system. The first is the
flurry of mergers and acquisitions that has
occurred; the second is the passage of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Financial Services Mod-
ernization Act (Senate Bill 900) on November
12, 1999.
Like much of the industrialized economy,
in the past few years the U.S. banking sector has
experienced numerous mergers and acquisi-
tions. Several mergers involved the country’s
largest banks, most notably the combinations 
of Citicorp and Travelers Group, Banc One 
and First Chicago, and NationsBank and
BankAmerica. This consolidation trend has not
been confined to the United States; there have
been numerous mergers in such countries as
Japan, France, and Germany, as well as cross-
country mergers such as that of Deutsche Bank
and Bankers Trust (Table 1). Although in terms
of dollar value mergers peaked in the United
States in 1998, there continues to be consider-
able consolidation activity (Table 2). Its impact
on the degree of competition and on the indus-
try’s structure both here and abroad is of con-
cern to both economists and regulators.
The Financial Services Modernization Act,
the other factor that could alter the industry’s
underlying structure, essentially repealed the
Banking Act of 1933, more commonly called the
Glass–Steagall Act. Glass–Steagall separated
commercial banking, insurance, and investment
banking into three distinct businesses that were
prohibited from engaging in each other’s activi-
ties. For example, banks could not offer insur-
ance or underwrite securities. Although the legal
barriers between these sectors had eroded over
time, banks were still prevented from com-
pletely entering the other two businesses.
1 By
lifting these statutory barriers, the new legisla-
tion could accelerate the merger of firms across
the financial services industry (in contrast to the
recent mergers within the banking sector). This
could also lead to a less competitive financial
and banking sector.
These two events, and the resulting con-
solidation, highlight the importance of under-
standing how this sector’s structure (that is, the
degree to which it is competitive) impacts various
aspects of the economy and future economic
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growth. This, along with recent empirical work
showing the importance of financial market
development for economic growth, has gener-
ated research aimed at determining the macro-
economic impact resulting from differences in
the industrial organization of the banking sys-
tem. There is no single, simple answer to this
question. Thus, this article focuses on some of
the theoretical research examining how the
banking sector’s underlying structure affects the
economy and economic growth.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Economists have long recognized that
financial markets in general, and banks in par-
ticular, play a vital role in the efficient function-
ing and development of any economy.
2 Some
of the recent research examining the relation-
ship between banks, financial markets, and the
macroeconomy have their origins in early work
by Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon
(1973), and Shaw (1973).
3 These authors high-
light the fact that financial markets affect, and in
turn are affected by, economic growth. They
argue that well-developed financial markets are
necessary for the overall economic advance-
ment of less developed countries.
Townsend (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) represent the next major work in this
area. They developed some of the first banking-
related models based on utility and profit maxi-
mization rather than on assumptions of the re-
sulting behavior. Their models focus primarily
on the part asymmetric information plays in the
allocation of resources.
4 Much of the subsequent
research in this area focuses on banks’ and finan-
cial markets’ role in helping overcome informa-
tion gaps between borrowers and lenders.
With the work of Townsend and Stiglitz
and Weiss as a foundation, Diamond (1984),
Gale and Hellwig (1985), Boyd and Prescott
(1986), and Williamson (1986, 1987) developed
theoretical frameworks that model financial
intermediaries more explicitly. Banks arise nat-
urally in these models as a means for overcom-
ing asymmetric information problems. The par-
ticular form of this problem is that it is costly for
lenders (or banks) to obtain information about
borrowers and their projects. In these models,
banks possess economies of scale with respect
to gathering information and monitoring firms
and thus are more efficient (or more cost-effec-
tive) than individual investors could be.
Until the early 1990s, most of the research
focused primarily on a theoretical understanding
of the relationship between banks and borrowers
and justifying the existence of banks within the
framework examined—that is, what services a
bank could provide that individuals could not
accomplish for themselves. However, in the 1990s
theoretical and empirical research returned to
Table 1
Recent Merger Activity of World’s Largest Banks
1998 assets
(in billions of U.S. dollars) Mergers and acquisitions
Mizuho Financial Group 1,342,351 Industrial Bank of Japan and Dai Ichi
Kangyo and Fuji Bank*
Sumitomo Bank/Sakura Bank 877,977 Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank†
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group 804,008 Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi Bank
and Mitsubishi Trust and Bank†
Deutsche Bank 735,808 Deutsche Bank and Bankers Trust
Sanwa Bank/Tokai Bank 694,114 Sanwa Bank and Tokai Bank†
BNP Paribas 692,713 BNP and Paribas
United Bank of Switzerland 687,316 Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank
Citigroup 668,641 Citicorp and Travelers Group
Bank of America 617,679 NationsBank and BankAmerica
HypoVereinsbank 541,032 Hypo-Bank and Bayerische Vereinsbank
* Scheduled for completion in 2002.
† Scheduled for completion in 2001.
SOURCES: 1999 Fortune Global 500; Dow Jones Interactive; Federal Reserve Board of Governors.13 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2000
the focus of the late 1960s and early 1970s, more
closely examining the relationship between the
financial sector and economic growth.
Recent empirical work on this relationship
has established a strong, positive association
between the development of a formal financial
sector and an economy’s level (or rate of growth)
of real activity. King and Levine (1993b) estab-
lish that the banking sector’s development is not
only correlated with economic growth but is
also a cause of long-term growth. Subsequent
work has refined King and Levine and estab-
lished that financial markets (defined more
broadly than in their work) are a source of eco-
nomic growth.
5,6
In addition, a theoretical literature explor-
ing the nature of the correlation between the
banking sector and economic growth has devel-
oped. It suggests that the financial system could
impact real economic performance by affecting
the composition of savings (Bencivenga and
Smith 1991), providing information (Greenwood
and Jovanovic 1990), and affecting the scope for
credit rationing (Bencivenga and Smith 1993;
Boyd and Smith 1997, 1998).
7 However, most of
the theoretical literature on the relationship
between intermediation and growth considers
an economy with a competitive banking system.
As a practical matter, economies display sub-
stantial variation in the competitive environment
of their banking systems.
Table 3 provides an approximate measure
—concentration ratios—for the degree of com-
petition within various countries’ banking sec-
tors. Ascertaining the actual level of competitive-
ness within the industry is extremely difficult.
Consequently, concentration ratios (the fraction
of the banking market served by the largest 
four or five banks) are often used as a proxy to
measure competitiveness. It should be noted
that these ratios are an imperfect measure, as
even if the largest banks control most of the
market, they still might compete fiercely among
themselves.
As a result of these differences, more re-
cent theoretical research has begun examining
the banking sector’s market structure along two
lines. The first, characterized by Krasa and
Villamil (1992) and Winton (1995), examines the
optimal size, number, and capitalization of
banks. Although these studies deal somewhat
with bank structure, they focus primarily on the
optimal size of banks when risk exists in the
environment—that is, when portfolio risk can-
not be completely diversified away.
The second line of research focuses on
comparing economies that are identical except
for the structure of the banking system. These
models examine the impact bank structure has
on some particular aspect of the economy. Thus,
they assume a particular market structure (either
competitive banks or a monopoly bank), as
opposed to ascertaining the optimal bank size
and number. It is this line of research that this
article explores.
BANK STRUCTURE AND THE ECONOMY
To examine the economic impact of a
banking system’s structure, most theoretical
Table 2
Value of Recent U.S. Mergers
Assets of acquired banks
Acquired banks (in billions of U.S. dollars)
Total for 1998 1,016,565
Largest mergers
Travelers Group Citicorp 310,897
NationsBank BankAmerica and Barnett 304,164
Bank One First Chicago and First Commerce 132,407
Total for 1999 309,749
Largest mergers
Deutsche Bank Bankers Trust 156,267
Fleet Financial BankBoston and Matewan Bancshares 76,392
HSBC Holding Republic New York 50,453
NOTES: 1999 total is for mergers completed as of November 30.The HSBC/Republic merger is pending.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board of Governors.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 14
models compare economies with competitive
banking systems with those having monopolis-
tic systems.
8 Although few, if any, banking sys-
tems are true monopolies, comparing these two
extremes sheds light on how the degree of 
competition in the banking system affects the
economy.
It is well understood that monopolies tend
to reduce an economy’s overall social welfare.
They charge higher prices and produce less
than optimal amounts of goods and services,
they stifle invention and innovation, and they
distort resource allocation, all of which reduce
capital accumulation and growth. This charac-
terization of the negative aspects of a monopoly
also applies to the banking sector. One would
expect a monopoly bank to make fewer loans
and to have higher service fees, higher interest
rates on loans, and lower interest rates on
deposits than a competitive bank. However, the
idea that a monopoly is only detrimental to an
economy is predicated on the existence of com-
plete markets and complete information. In the
real world neither markets nor information
tends to be complete. This is especially true of
financial markets and the banking industry.
Unlike many businesses, banks do not
produce physical goods but, rather, provide the
financial means for production. One of the
biggest problems the banking sector faces is a
lack of information about both the individuals
requesting funds and the projects they propose
to undertake with the loans. This asymmetric
information leads to problems of adverse selec-
tion—choosing the most profitable borrowers
—and moral hazard—convincing borrowers to
use funds in less risky ways. These inherent
problems, which are difficult for a competitive
banking system to overcome, can be eased or
eliminated by a monopolistic (or oligopolistic)
banking system. However, for a complete com-
parison between economies with different
banking system structures, the gains from a
monopolistic system must be weighed against
the losses mentioned above.
The recent literature can be divided into
two groups, based on the economic framework
used: partial equilibrium models and general
equilibrium models. The partial equilibrium
models focus on some particular aspect of the
bank–borrower relationship and ascertain how
the market structure of the banking system
impacts it. Generally, these models do not take
into account all major aspects of banks—in par-
ticular, they tend to ignore the deposit side of
banking—nor are they concerned with the
overall economic impact of the particular bank-
ing structure. However, they illustrate the point
that a monopoly bank can be beneficial in that
it helps overcome the problems associated with
asymmetric information.
The general equilibrium models also focus
on one particular aspect of the bank–borrower
relationship. However, these models also con-
sider the deposit side of banking and are con-
cerned with the overall economic impact of the
banking system. Thus, they are better for ascer-
taining whether the costs outweigh the benefits
of a monopoly bank. One consequence of being
able to examine both the costs and benefits is
that the relationship between borrowers and
banks is often modeled with less richness and
Table 3































NOTES: Concentrations are the five largest banks’
assets as a percentage of total banking
system assets, except for China, which is
the four largest banks’ assets. Poland
rose to 51 percent on January 1, 1999.
SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements
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detail. The next sections describe six recent
studies and detail some of the theoretical bene-




To illustrate the benefits of a monopoly
bank, it is useful to begin with a review of
recent partial equilibrium models. These models
deal with the basic problem of asymmetric
information between banks and borrowers—
adverse selection and moral hazard—in several
standard ways.
Numerous theoretical models address the
problems of adverse selection and the economic
implications of banks’ inability to distinguish
between different classes of potential borrowers.
Generally, there are two primary methods by
which banks determine creditworthiness: screen-
ing of potential borrowers prior to making a
loan and inducing borrowers to reveal the true
nature of their investment project. In models
where a bank screens potential borrowers, it
gathers the information needed to determine
(usually under the assumption of certainty)
whether the borrower’s investment project will
produce a good or bad return. However,
screening is costly in that it consumes resources
and profits. Alternatively, the bank can induce
borrowers to truthfully state whether their invest-
ment projects’ returns are expected to be good
or bad. This is usually accomplished by the
choice of contract terms and the interest rates
on loans or by rationing credit to their projects.
10
Moral hazard is the other primary problem
that arises between borrowers and lenders.
When the borrower has several investment
choices, it is in the bank’s interest to induce the
borrower to undertake the project that is less
risky and more likely to have a positive return.
Of the three studies discussed in this sec-
tion, Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Schnitzer
(1998a) consider the problems of both adverse
selection and moral hazard, whereas Caminal
and Matutes (1997) make the moral hazard
problem paramount. Petersen and Rajan rely on
inducing borrowers to take appropriate actions,
while Schnitzer relies on screening to overcome
the asymmetric information problem. Caminal
and Matutes use both techniques.
Long-term Relationships, Credit Rationing,
and Banks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) are partic-
ularly interested in understanding the long-term
relationships between banks and businesses.
They ask two questions: Can firms facing com-
petitive credit markets form strong ties with a
particular creditor? And do the benefits from
forming such ties diminish as markets become
more competitive? The questions arise from the
idea established in the labor literature that 
competition and long-term relationships are in-
compatible.
11 The authors also empirically study
the U.S. small business market, as bank finance
and the degree of competition vary at the local
level in this market. They find that less compe-
tition in the banking industry leads to more
firms obtaining loans, and they obtain these
loans at a lower cost.
Petersen and Rajan employ a static, three-
period model, with two classes of borrowers—
those with good project returns and those with
bad project returns. Bad-return borrowers who
borrow in the initial period (at date 0) will
receive a return of zero in the following period
(at date 1). Good-return borrowers have two
projects in which they can invest, hence the
moral hazard in the model. They have access to
both a risky and a riskless technology. The risky
project has a higher return than the riskless pro-
ject with some given probability; otherwise it
returns nothing. Any returns from the initial pro-
ject are used to partially finance subsequent
investment projects. However, in spite of pos-
sessing some initial capital, the good-return
entrepreneur must also borrow to fully fund a
project in the next period (at date 1).
Banks are the only source of funding in the
economy. At date 0, banks are unable to differ-
entiate between good- and bad-return borrowers.
At the beginning of date 1, all borrowers’ types
are revealed, and thus loans at this date are only
made to good-return borrowers. It is assumed
contracts take the form of debt contracts. Finally,
this model does not address how the deposits
needed to make the loans are obtained.
In equilibrium banks will offer two se-
quential one-period loan contracts as opposed
to one two-period contract. This stems from
both the adverse selection problem experienced
at date 0, as well as the moral hazard problem
pertaining to good-return borrowers at both
dates 0 and 1. If the bank offers a two-period
contract, the result will be higher interest rates
on loans, relative to two one-period contracts, at
date 0 in an attempt to cover potential losses
from loans to bad-return borrowers. This higher
rate exacerbates the moral hazard problem,
which can lead to credit rationing by the bank.
The bank can minimize these problems by
offering two sequential one-period debt con-
tracts. In addition, good-return borrowers will
borrow as little as possible at date 0 to differen-
tiate themselves from bad-return borrowers.
This will also reduce borrowing costs in theFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 16
subsequent period. Finally, banks will structure
loans and interest rates so that they induce the
good-return borrowers to choose the less risky
project and so that banks can recoup all costs
associated with lending at all dates.
The authors demonstrate that as market
power increases, firms with lower credit quality
are able to obtain funding. The intuition is that
as market power increases, it is easier for banks
to extract more surplus from firms in subse-
quent periods. This can also be viewed as 
banks implicitly taking an equity stake in firms.
Petersen and Rajan also show that as market
power increases, the initial interest rate offered
to the lowest-quality firms obtaining financing
becomes lower than that in a purely competitive
banking system. Thus, greater financing to more
firms is achieved as the banking system be-
comes less competitive. The authors conclude
by empirically investigating these theoretical
results using U.S. small business data.
12
Bank Structure and Bank Solvency. The sec-
ond partial equilibrium model, Caminal and
Matutes (1997), explores the relationship be-
tween market structure and the solvency of the
banking sector. The authors’ reason for investi-
gating the linkage is the recent deregulation in
the banking and financial markets. They note
that one of the primary goals of this deregula-
tion has been to improve the efficiency of banks
by increasing competition between them.
However, it is often argued that too much com-
petition can jeopardize the solvency of the
entire banking system.
13 Caminal and Matutes
show that a monopoly bank will raise the vol-
ume of loans (and thus, the volume of risky
loans) to certain borrowers while decreasing the
volume of (risky) loans to other borrowers.
Thus, they are unable to draw clear-cut conclu-
sions about the relationship between market
structure and solvency.
The basic model is static and incorporates
market uncertainty, asymmetric information,
and moral hazard. Moral hazard, the primary
problem, arises because borrowers can choose
from a range of production technologies.
Caminal and Matutes incorporate asymmetric
information and economic uncertainty into their
theoretical framework in three ways. First, infor-
mational asymmetries can be reduced either by
monitoring or by rationing credit. By monitor-
ing, the authors mean the bank can choose and
supervise the production technology the firm
uses. Monitoring, therefore, is conducted prior
to making the loan and has the flavor of the
German banking system, in which banks have
seats on the boards of businesses to which they
make loans. In addition, monitoring is costly
and borrower-specific. Thus, monitoring is a
costly way to eliminate the moral hazard prob-
lem inherent in this model.
In lieu of monitoring, a bank may ration
credit by providing smaller loans than borrow-
ers desire. However, credit rationing and moni-
toring are not perfect substitutes. If the bank
monitors, there obviously is no reason to ration
credit (and thus the loan size will be larger than
without monitoring). When the bank rations
Figure 1
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credit, it does so to induce borrowers to choose
a less risky production technology.
14 The final
aspect of the model relates the size of a loan to
its level of riskiness. The larger the loan, the
riskier it will be. This stems from the assumption
that a borrower’s return depends on both the
size of the loan and a multiplicative aggregate
shock.
The contract between the bank(s) and
borrowers develops in stages (Figure 1). First,
the bank offers an interest rate and the guaran-
tee that neither it (nor the firm) will be forced
to lend (or borrow) more than either party
would like. Next, the bank learns the cost of
monitoring and decides whether to monitor.
The bank then offers a maximum loan amount.
At this point, the firm can attempt to renegotiate
the interest rate, the loan size, or both. After the
success (or failure) of any renegotiations, the
firm chooses the size of loan, given the agreed-
upon interest rate. Finally, the production tech-
nology is chosen (by the bank if monitoring or
by the borrower if not), production is under-
taken, and repayment is made according to the
contract. All contracts between banks and bor-
rowers are assumed to be standard debt con-
tracts. As with Petersen and Rajan, the deposit
side is ignored and it is assumed a bank can
obtain as much in deposits as needed to make
loans, at a cost that is not prohibitive.
Caminal and Matutes show that market
power in banking raises the interest rate on
loans, which has two repercussions. First, for a
given level of monitoring, the higher the inter-
est rate, the worse the incentive problem. This,
in turn, results in a tightening of credit and
smaller loans to the credit-constrained group.
However, higher interest rates will also lead the
bank to increase monitoring, which will reduce
the proportion of credit-constrained borrowers.
Thus, the higher interest rate associated with a
monopoly bank has two, opposite effects on the
volume of loans. More borrowers (and more
risky borrowers) will receive loans due to the
increase in monitoring. This is offset by the fact
that those who are credit-constrained receive
smaller loans than they otherwise would.
This ambiguity about monopoly banking’s
impact on total loan volume leads to ambiguity
about the relationship between market power
and banking system solvency. The greater the
volume and the larger each individual loan, the
greater the probability of a bank failure. The
number of loans to those who are not credit-
rationed increases, implying that bank failure is
more likely, while the size of the loans to those
who are credit-rationed decreases, implying that
failure is less likely. Consequently, it is impossi-
ble to draw a clear-cut conclusion about the re-
lationship between the structure and the sol-
vency of the banking system.
Screening Borrowers, Restructuring Firms,
and Banks. The partial equilibrium model by
Schnitzer (1998a) examines how banks use
screening in deciding loan disbursement.
15
Schnitzer evaluates the economic prospects of
firms in transition economies, particularly those
of Eastern Europe. Although not directly inter-
ested in how banking sector structure impacts
the economy, she argues that banks in transi-
tion economies play a fundamental role in the
financing, monitoring, and restructuring of
firms.
16 Consequently, she addresses two ques-
tions. First, how does the market structure of the
banking sector impact the screening process for
obtaining financing? Second, how does banking
structure affect the likelihood of restructuring by
a firm’s manager? Her results are mixed in that
a competitive banking sector will result in too
little screening but more restructuring than a
monopolistic system.
There are two agents in Schnitzer’s econ-
omy: a firm and either a monopoly bank or two
banks acting as Bertrand competitors.
17 The firm
has an investment project with uncertain return
that must be financed with credit. The return to
the investment is either good, with some given
probability, or it is bad. There is no moral haz-
ard problem with respect to the operation of the
project. Banks, the only source of financing in
the economy, must decide whether to screen
borrowers and then to whom to give loans.
Screening is costly but perfectly reveals whether
the investment is good or bad. It is assumed the
cost of screening is low enough that the returns
from lending only for good projects exceed the
costs of screening. Finally, how banks obtain
the deposits necessary to make loans is not
modeled. It is assumed that the banks can
obtain sufficient deposits to fund all borrowers
and that the cost of obtaining these funds is not
prohibitive.
A monopoly bank in this economy always
screens. The cost of screening is assumed to be
less than the expected losses from making loans
for bad-return projects; thus, the bank will only
make loans for good-return projects. The bank
will set the interest rate sufficiently high that it
extracts all surplus from the investment projects.
These results are compared with those
from an economy with two banks engaged in
Bertrand competition. The competitive banking
scenario is further divided into two cases: one
where screening produces informational spill-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 18
overs and one where it does not. In the first
case, because of the informational spillovers, if
either bank screens and ascertains the bor-
rower’s particular project return, this informa-
tion becomes public knowledge. In this case,
neither bank will engage in screening because
there exists a classic free rider problem. Thus, 
in equilibrium both good- and bad-return bor-
rowers will obtain financing as banks randomly
make loans. This is inferior to the equilibrium
with a monopoly bank because, by assumption,
the losses associated with loans to bad projects
exceed the costs of screening.
In the second case, informational spill-
overs do not exist—that is, screening produces
private information. Under this condition three
equilibria exist. One is an (unique, mixed strategy)
equilibrium where both banks screen with some
positive probability. There are also two (sym-
metric, pure strategy) equilibria where one bank
screens and the other does not. All of these
equilibria are less efficient than the monopoly
bank because either banks duplicate screening
costs or, as before, losses from lending without
screening exceed the costs of screening. Thus,
screening technology is most efficiently used in
an economy with a monopolistic banking system.
Schnitzer also shows that a competitive
system is more likely to lead to firms restructur-
ing. In her model, restructuring is defined as the
manager spending some unobservable effort
attempting to make the project more profitable
and results in one of two outcomes. Either the
effort, which is decided upon before credit
offers or screening, can raise the probability that
the project will generate a good return, or it can
increase the project’s return. In either case,
restructuring only occurs when the banking sys-
tem is competitive. This is because under a
competitive system, the manager is able to keep
part of the increased returns resulting from his
or her efforts. With a monopoly bank, the bank
confiscates any extra return (by choice of inter-
est rate), and thus, the manager lacks the incen-
tive to undertake restructuring.
Remarks. Although each of the three studies
discussed examines different aspects of the
bank–borrower relationship, all find that mo-
nopoly in banking may be economically benefi-
cial because of the bank’s ability to overcome
problems related to adverse selection and moral
hazard. However, there are two important
caveats. First and foremost, since these are par-
tial equilibrium models, they do not take into
account all the economic effects of bank struc-
ture. Their conclusion—that monopoly may be
beneficial—is limited to the specific problem
each study examines and does not imply the
benefits from a monopoly outweigh all the
costs. In addition, all the models focus only on
the bank–borrower relationship and ignore the
deposit side of banking—an important omis-
sion that may affect the results.
General Equilibrium Models
The remaining three models—Cetorelli
(1997), Smith (1998), and Guzman (forthcom-
ing)—are general equilibrium (and overlapping
generations) models. As a result, they allow for
an exploration of the deposit side of banking
and its potential constraint on the lending side,
as well as for an examination of monopoly’s
detrimental impact on capital accumulation and
growth. However, as a trade-off for a general
equilibrium framework, they do not model the
interaction of banks and borrowers with as
much richness as some of the partial equilib-
rium models. For example, they all ignore the
possibility of moral hazard and deal only with
the problem of adverse selection.
Screening and Banks Revisited. Like Schnitzer,
Cetorelli (1997) investigates how the structure of
the banking system affects the screening
process.
18 However, unlike the first three models
discussed, the equilibrium achieved with a mo-
nopolistic banking system is not necessarily
superior to (Pareto dominates) the equilibrium
from a competitive system. Cetorelli’s results dif-
fer from Schnitzer’s because he employs a gen-
eral equilibrium model that takes into account
monopoly profits’ negative impact on capital
accumulation.
Cetorelli notes that many countries—such
as the United States during the Civil War, postwar
Japan, and European countries in the nineteenth
century—seem to have experienced enhanced
growth in periods during which the financial sec-
tor was less competitive and more concentrated.
This observation forms the basis for the question
Cetorelli investigates: How does credit market
competitiveness impact economic growth?
The basic economic model Cetorelli uses
is a standard Diamond (1965) overlapping-
generations model with production. However,
production is a two-stage process, where in the
first stage, potential entrepreneurs attempt to set
up a project. If they succeed, in the next stage
they produce goods after renting capital and
labor. To set up a project, entrepreneurs are
required to borrow funds from banks. At the
beginning of each period, every young individ-
ual is a potential entrepreneur. The young can
further be divided into two groups: those entre-
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succeed with some given probability—and
those with bad project returns—who will be
unsuccessful. If unsuccessful in starting a pro-
ject, the individual provides labor in the second
stage of production.
Banks are the only entities that provide
credit for stage one of production. It is argued
that banks will naturally arise due to economies
of scale with respect to both diversification
across borrowers and with respect to the screen-
ing process. As with Schnitzer, screening is
costly, but it does provide perfect information
about an entrepreneur’s type (either good or
bad project returns). Cetorelli further assumes
that once an individual is screened, there are
perfect informational spillovers and all banks in
the economy know his or her type. Finally,
screening costs are not constant and are, in fact,
proportional to the amount of saving.
Cetorelli compares two economies—one
with Bertrand competitors and the other with a
monopoly bank—in terms of capital accumula-
tion and steady-state levels of the capital stock.
Bertrand competition, in conjunction with the
perfect informational spillovers associated with
screening, renders screening economically
infeasible; as before, a free rider problem exists.
A monopoly bank, in contrast, will always
screen as screening costs are lower than the
losses from lending to bad-return entrepreneurs.
Consequently, because a monopoly bank
screens and is thus more efficient in the loans it
makes, capital accumulation will be greater.
However, there is also a downside to the
monopoly bank. It is assumed bank profits are
consumed by the bank and not rebated to any
individuals in the economy. Thus, instead of
these profits being used to create future capital,
as is the case with a competitive banking sys-
tem, they are lost to the economy. It is not obvi-
ous which of these forces—efficiency gains
from screening or production losses from prof-
its—will dominate and, consequently, whether
a monopoly bank benefits the economy.
Cetorelli also examines the model’s com-
parative statics to ascertain the conditions under
which a monopoly bank would definitely lead
to greater capital accumulation than a competi-
tive system would. He finds that given a suffi-
ciently low proportion of high-quality entrepre-
neurs and other conditions—such as low
screening costs, high savings elasticity, and low
loan-demand elasticity—capital accumulation
and growth will be greater with a monopoly
bank. Finally, Cetorelli also discusses in what
types of countries these conditions are likely to
prevail.
Bank Solvency Revisited. Smith (1998)
focuses on how monopoly in banking affects
both income levels and the likelihood of dra-
matic swings in the business cycle. His impetus
is similar to that of Caminal and Matutes; he
observes that the stability of the banking indus-
try appears to be enhanced when only a limited
number of banks exert significant market power.
This market power is often the result of regula-
tory barriers enacted by various governmental
bodies. Smith shows that a competitive banking
system will result in a higher level of income
and output and in a reduction in the severity of
the business cycle.
Like Cetorelli, Smith uses a standard
Diamond (1965) overlapping-generations model
with production. In addition, production is sub-
ject to stochastic shocks. There are two types of
individuals in the economy: lenders and entre-
preneurs. Lenders have three ways to save for
old age. They can allocate their wage income to
direct, bilateral loans to an entrepreneur, to
deposits at a bank, or to investments in a stor-
age technology. Entrepreneurs can either save
their income by one of these means, or they can
invest it in a risky project.
19 Entrepreneurs fall
into three categories: those who do not need to
borrow to fund a project, those who need to
borrow less than half the start-up cost of the
project, and those who need to borrow more
than half the project’s start-up cost.
Borrowers have two sources of financing:
banks and direct, bilateral (unintermediated)
loans.
20 Banks and individual lenders are
assumed to act as Bertrand competitors.
Although the model allows for bilateral con-
tracts, in equilibrium they are not chosen.
However, they are important to the model in
that they limit a monopoly bank’s power to
impose any interest rate it chooses—that is,
they place an upper bound on interest rates.
Consequently, banks are the only channel for
transferring funds from lenders to borrowers.
Although banks in this model do not screen,
they can monitor borrowers’ returns after the
investment project is completed. The decision
to monitor is made prior to making the loan 
(as in Diamond 1984), and monitoring is
costly.
21 Finally, it is assumed there are suffi-
cient deposits for a bank to fund any number of
borrowers it chooses.
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Smith shows that a competitive banking
system is better than a monopoly system in that
it allows for higher incomes and reduces the
severity of the business cycle. Banks in general
benefit the economy because their monitoring
costs are lower than those incurred with bilat-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 20
eral lending. With a competitive system, these
savings are used for additional loans, resulting
in increases in production and income. When
there is a monopoly bank, the savings are
appropriated (by means of higher interest rates
on loans) by the bank in the form of profits
(and consumed by the owners). Thus, less pro-
ductive investment is possible.
Higher interest rates have a second detri-
mental impact on the economy: they raise the
opportunity cost of obtaining funds for all 
borrowers—even those who are good risks.
The intuition is that higher interest rates on
loans increase the return on bank liabilities.
The higher opportunity cost of funds filters
through to borrowing rates in all markets for
loans, regardless of the type of borrower, and
this results in more firms needing to borrow 
to finance their projects. Finally, Smith also
shows that adverse shocks to the economy are
less pervasive in a system with competitive
banks.
Credit Rationing and Bank Structure Revis-
ited. Like Cetorelli, and to a lesser degree Smith,
Guzman (forthcoming) is interested in the
impact the banking system’s market structure
has on capital accumulation and economic
growth. Guzman also examines how market
structure affects the quantity and the likelihood
of credit rationing to arise. Most of the recent
theoretical literature that explores the relation-
ship between growth and banking and includes
credit rationing as a possibility considers only
economies with competitive banking systems.
As a practical matter though, banking systems’
industrial organization varies widely across
countries. Thus, the relationship between banks
and the economy is unclear when a country’s
banking system is not competitive. This is the
impetus for Guzman’s work. He shows that
monopoly in banking tends to be detrimental 
to the economy because it decreases capital
accumulation and growth and exacerbates the
problems associated with credit rationing.
As with the other two general equilibrium
models, Guzman uses a variant of the Diamond
(1965) overlapping-generations model with pro-
duction. Two types of individuals populate the
economy: lenders and borrowers. Lenders, who
earn wage income when young, have two
options for allocating this income: they can
deposit it with a bank or use it in their own
investment project.
23 Borrowers have no income
when young but do have investment projects,
which, on average, are more productive than
those of lenders. Borrowers must obtain financ-
ing to operate projects, and all borrowers are
identical (ex ante) since project returns are
drawn from the same random distribution
(Figure 2). The return to a borrower’s project is
private information available to anyone for a
fixed cost.
The basic contract between banks and
borrowers is a standard debt contract. If feasi-
ble, the borrower repays principal plus interest
on the loan. Otherwise, the borrower defaults
on the loan and the bank verifies the borrower’s
return and retains all proceeds from the invest-
ment project. Guzman shows that monopoly in
banking tends to reduce capital accumulation
and growth in the economy. Monopoly is also
more likely to lead to credit rationing, and when
rationing occurs, it tends to be more severe
under a monopoly than under a competitive
system.
24
The intuition behind these results is best
understood by looking at the differences be-
tween the interest rate charged on loans and
Figure 2
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paid on deposits in each type of banking sys-
tem. When credit rationing exists, the interest
rate on loans is the same under both systems
because the shortage of funds results in bor-
rowers bidding up the price of funds to the
same level. The monopoly bank pays a lower
return on deposits (the source of the bank’s
profits), which results in less funding being
available for borrowers. This leads to a greater
likelihood of credit rationing and less growth as
fewer borrowers undertake productive invest-
ment projects.
When credit is not rationed and all bor-
rowers are funded, the interest rate on deposits
is the same under both systems. Because the
same number of borrowers is funded under
either system, the same amount of funds must
be deposited in the banks. The quantity of
deposits depends only on the deposit interest
rate, and thus the same interest rate on deposits
prevails independent of the banking system. A
monopoly charges a higher interest rate on
loans (its source of profits). This leads to more
monitoring of borrowers than with a competi-
tive system, as the likelihood of default rises
with the interest rate. Thus, a monopoly uses
more resources to operate and directs fewer
resources to productive investment, resulting in
lower growth and capital accumulation. Finally,
in some instances the monopoly bank will both
charge a higher interest rate on loans and pay a
lower rate on deposits. This results in more
severe credit rationing, more monitoring, fewer
borrowers undertaking investment projects, and
ultimately less capital accumulation and eco-
nomic growth.
Remarks. As with the partial equilibrium
models, there is a common theme with the gen-
eral equilibrium models: monopoly in banking
will generally be detrimental to the economy as
it results in less capital accumulation and lower
economic growth. This is in stark contrast to the
results from the partial equilibrium models. This
difference in conclusions results from the fact
that the general equilibrium models take into
account the detrimental effects that accrue from
a monopoly bank—particularly that monopo-
lies consume productive resources by maintain-
ing profits at a higher level than competitive
systems. However, it should be noted that one 
of the drawbacks to the general equilibrium
models is that to be able to draw conclusions
from these models, they sometimes have to sac-
rifice richness in terms of how individuals are
modeled—especially the lack of moral hazard
connected with choosing more or less risky
investment projects.
CONCLUSION
Recent events have drawn attention to the
banking industry, one of the most important
and vital sectors needed for an efficient market
economy. It is important to understand how the
various aspects of the banking system in general
and the underlying structure of the banking sec-
tor in particular affect economic growth and
development. Only recently have economists
begun researching and better understanding the
economic impact of the banking sector’s market
structure.
Although this article describes only a few
studies, they are representative of the most re-
cent research and allow for some general conclu-
sions about how a monopoly bank is modeled
and about bank structure’s importance to the
macroeconomy. The research also suggests some
possibilities for future work.
One result drawn from these studies is that
monopoly in banking benefits certain aspects of
the economy. In particular, a monopoly bank
can help overcome, or at least mitigate, some 
of the problems inherent in the bank–borrower
relationship. As long as informational asymme-
tries exist and complete information is not 
easily and costlessly obtainable by all parties,
the problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard remain. A monopoly bank can partially
overcome these problems by screening pros-
pective borrowers, by using the choice of in-
terest rates and credit rationing to induce self-
selection and less risky behavior, or by relying
on the development of long-term relationships.
Using these techniques to address the problems
related to a lack of full information is often
more effectively and efficiently accomplished by
a monopoly bank.
However, when ascertaining the overall
economic impact, it is noteworthy that partial
equilibrium models find either that monopoly is
beneficial or that it is unclear whether a mo-
nopoly is beneficial or detrimental. General
equilibrium models find just the opposite. Either
monopoly is detrimental to the economy, or, at
best, the impact is ambiguous. This clearly indi-
cates that how completely the banking sector
and the economy are modeled is crucial to the
results obtained. A comparison of the results of
Schnitzer (a partial equilibrium model) and
Cetorelli (a general equilibrium model) high-
lights this as both models use screening to 
overcome the problem of adverse selection.
Both find that a monopoly bank screens more
efficiently than competitive banks. However,
Cetorelli also takes into account the full effectsFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 22
of a monopoly’s redistribution of resources away
from productive purposes (that is, profits) and
finds the overall impact of a monopoly is
ambiguous. This suggests that to determine the
macroeconomic impact of a less competitive
banking system, it is important to model more
than just the bank–borrower relationship.
It is interesting, however, that Cetorelli
does describe conditions under which monop-
oly would benefit the economy even under a
general equilibrium framework. Cetorelli argues
that the conditions under which monopoly
would be beneficial are most relevant to devel-
oping countries, which are plagued by asym-
metric information, problems with writing and
enforcing contracts, and a lower average quality
of productive capital than their developed coun-
terparts. He indicates that these problems may
be overcome, and result in greater capital accu-
mulation, with a monopolistic banking system.
This is in stark contrast to Smith and Guzman,
who find that monopoly is never beneficial.
This contrast indicates that even in the general
equilibrium framework, more research is needed
to understand under exactly what conditions
and in what types of countries having a less
competitive banking system might be beneficial.
The research this article reviews also sug-
gests other areas for future work. One of the
major drawbacks to the existing studies is that
most of them focus solely on one aspect of the
bank–borrower relationship or the bank–
depositor relationship. The partial equilibrium
models ignore the deposit side and assume that
sufficient funds can be costlessly obtained.
While the general equilibrium models consider
the deposit side, they do not provide a robust
treatment of how banks raise the funds needed
to make loans. Most of these models, with
Caminal and Matutes’ the exception, allow
banks the options of only screening before
making the loan or only rationing credit or only
monitoring after the investment project has con-
cluded. Banks often use a number of tools to
obtain information about prospective clients.
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It is also important to realize that real-
world financial markets are often heavily regu-
lated and significantly affected by government
policy. For example, the stock and bond mar-
kets often react sharply to government policy
announcements. Yet none of the models ana-
lyzed has scope for examining the economic
impact of monetary or fiscal policy.
26 Thus, it
will be important to develop models that not
only are better able to mimic the actual rela-
tionships between banks, borrowers, and de-
positors but that also allow the impact of gov-
ernment policy on the banking system and
economy to be explicitly analyzed.
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1 For example, although Citicorp and Travelers Group
merged in 1998, without this legislation Citigroup
would have been required to divest itself of the insur-
ance underwriting business in the next couple of years.
2 This article uses the terms banks, financial intermedi-
aries, banking system, and financial system inter-
changeably. The term financial market differs from
these terms in that it includes not only banks but also
the stock market, insurance companies, brokers, and
any other industry that provides financial capital to
entrepreneurs and businesses.
3 For a more detailed overview of the earlier literature,
see Gertler (1988). Much of this section is merely a
condensed version of this work.
4 Asymmetric information occurs when not all individuals
have the same information about the profitability of
current or future investment projects.
5 See, for example, Fernandez and Galetovic (1995)
and De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995). They qualify
King and Levine’s results by showing growth rates in
developed and less developed countries differ as
financial markets are established and mature.
6 See, for instance, Atje and Jovanovic (1993), King and
Levine (1993a), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996),
Levine and Zervos (1996), and Levine (1999).
7 See Pagano (1993), Levine (1996), and Greenwood
and Smith (1997) for an overview of some of this 
literature.
8 Most of the studies this article discusses assume
banks are entrepreneurs’ only source of financing.
Thus, these works deal not only with monopoly in
banking but, more generally, with monopoly in the
financial sector.
9 The work reviewed here is representative (but not
comprehensive) of the recent theoretical literature
comparing the impact of different banking structures
on various aspects of the economy.
10 Credit rationing usually takes one of two forms. Either
borrowers are denied loans, or they are unable to
obtain as large a loan as they would like. In most
cases, credit rationing is an equilibrium outcome and
not necessarily the result of market failures.
When credit rationing exists, borrowers with good
project returns will try to distinguish themselves from
those whose projects have bad returns. This is usually
accomplished through contract terms.
11 The authors build on the ideas that Becker (1975)
establishes. He examines the issue of companies pro-
viding training for employees when competitive labor23 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2000
markets allow employees to sever their relationship
with a firm after receiving training and before the firm
can recoup its training costs.
12 Since this article focuses on theoretical models,
Petersen and Rajan’s empirical results are not dis-
cussed in detail. The empirical results are consistent
with the theoretical implications of their model.
13 The basic idea behind this statement is that banks that
compete fiercely with each other often take on risky
loans and investments in an effort to obtain higher
profits. If these risky loans go bad (as was the case
with the savings and loan failures in the 1980s), the
result can be widespread failure in the banking sector.
14 Borrowers choose more efficient (less risky) projects if
the expected marginal return on the investment is suf-
ficiently greater than the interest rate (cost of funds).
The return from the project depends on the marginal
productivity of capital, which is inversely related to the
quantity of capital. Thus, credit rationing results in a
smaller amount of capital being obtained from the
bank. The smaller the amount of capital, the higher the
return from the investment and the more likely the
entrepreneur will choose the less risky project.
15 See, for example, Broecker (1990), Riordan (1993),
and Schnitzer (1998b) for other research examining
how bank structure affects the screening process.
16 Banks’ importance in firm financing is much greater in
transition and developing economies than in developed
economies because capital markets (and property
rights) are usually not as well developed. See Buch
(1998) for a discussion of banks’ role in transition
economies.
17 Bertrand competition occurs when firms compete only
on the price they charge for a good or service.
Generally, the firm with the lowest price will make all
the sales. Consequently, with this type of competition
firms ultimately charge the same low price.
18 Cetorelli (1995) also examines the impact of bank
structure on the macroeconomy. However, the focus of
that paper is on how bank structure impacts the adop-
tion of higher quality technology.
19 If borrowers invest in the risky project, their return is
drawn from an identical random distribution. Thus,
prior to operating their investment project all borrowers
are identical with respect to the expected return on
their project.
20 Contracts between lenders and borrowers are
assumed to be bilateral to make lenders functionally
different from banks, which are merely groups of
lenders pooling their resources.
21 Economies of scale in monitoring loans give bank
loans another advantage over bilateral lender con-
tracts. Such economies are another reason only banks
exist in equilibrium.
22 Unlike the partial equilibrium models, this model’s
assumption is more binding in that it constrains the level
of capital stock needed for lending to be undertaken.
23 The latter option gives rise to a more robust method for
understanding the restrictions the deposit side places
on banks’ ability to make loans. Although banks face
an upward-sloping supply of loanable funds, the link
between deposits and loans is significantly weakened
by the fact that borrowers’ demand for loans is mod-
eled as being interest inelastic.
24 Credit rationing can occur for two reasons in this
model. First, it occurs if total lender income is not high
enough to meet all borrowers’ demands; this can hap-
pen whether banking is competitive or monopolistic.
Second, even if lender income is sufficient to meet all
borrowers’ needs, loan demand may be greater than
the funds banks obtain from deposits. If banks do not
offer a sufficiently high interest rate on deposits, they
may not entice enough lenders to deposit with the
bank—resulting in a shortage of funds for borrowers.
25 Bose and Cothren (1996) model banks as having the
option to both screen and ration credit to potential 
borrowers. However, they do not compare the eco-
nomic impact of different banking structures when
banks have access to both options.
26 Siegel (1981) is an early article that compares mone-
tary policy’s impact on certain aspects of the economy
when the banking system is competitive and when it is
monopolistic.
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